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Ante Rem Structuralism and the No-Naming
Constraint
Teresa Kouri
October 19, 2015

Tim Räz (2015) presents what he takes to be a new objection to Stewart Shapiro’s
ante rem structuralism (ARS). Räz claims that ARS conflicts with mathematical practice. I will explain why this is similar to an old problem, posed originally by John
Burgess (1999) and Jukka Keränen (2001), and show that Shapiro can use the solution
to the original problem in Räz’s case. Additionally, I will suggest that Räz’s proposed
treatment of the situation does not provide an argument for the in re over the ante rem
approach.

1

ARS and the Old Problem

Shapiro’s account of ante rem structuralism (ARS) is that mathematical objects are
places in structures. Each place is characterized by its relationships to other places in
the same structure. For example, the natural number three is the fourth place in the
natural number structure, characterized by the fact that it is the successor of the third
place in the same structure, the successor of the successor of the second place, etc.
One of the motivational constraints on any account of mathematical objects, for
1

Shapiro, is that it not require changes to mathematical practice. It must be consistent with what mathematicians actually do. This constraint is called the faithfulness
constraint (see Shapiro (1997, p 35)). ARS’s characterization of mathematical objects
seems to accord well with mathematical practice, since mathematicians often speak of
abstracting away from particular instantiations, and so it seems ARS initially satisfies
this constraint.
One of the problems often suggested raised by opponents of ARS is that it is not
able to distinguish between certain mathematical objects we know to be distinct, and
which mathematicians treat as distinct. Burgess (1999) and Keränen (2001) suggest,
for example, that since there is no “structural” difference between i and −i in the field
of complex numbers, they cannot be distinguished. There are two ways one might use
the word “distinguish” here. The first is metaphysical: we can metaphysically distinguish one object from another if the one has a property the other lacks. The second is
semantic: we can semantically distinguish one object from another by referring to one
(or, at least, talking about one) without talking about the other. The problem posed by
Burgess (1999) and Keränen (2001) is concerned with metaphysical distinguishability.
(Later, when we turn to Räz’s problem, we will be concerned with semantic distinguishability.) The complex numbers i and −i seem to share all of their “structural”
properties: they are both square roots of −1, for example. The roots are metaphysically indistinguishable. Worse still, it seems that every point on the Euclidean plane
is metaphysically indistinguishable from every other; no point on the plane has any
structural property that another does not. Another example is a graph with n vertices
and no edges. The vertices have exactly the same relationships to each other, namely
none; they are metaphysically indistinguishable.
This is an instance where we must be careful about what a structural relationship
amounts to. Just what types of relationships these are is unsettled. Originally, critics
2

suggested that they must be formulae in one free variable (see Keränen (2001)). More
recently, other proposals have been made, the weakest being that these relationships are
exactly the non-reflexive relationships in any structure (see Leitgeb and Ladyman (2008)
and Ladyman (2005)). There is also a question as to whether identity is a structural
relation. If these relationships can include, for example, non-reflexive relationships, then
we will be able to distinguish the two square roots of −1; they are additive inverses
of each other, but neither is an additive inverse of itself. Shapiro himself holds that
identity, and non-identity, are structural relationships (see Shapiro (2008)).1 However,
aside from including identity as a structural relationship, there still seems to be no way
to distinguish metaphysically between the vertices in a graph with no edges. There
simply are no non-reflexive relationships there (other than non-identity).
The Keränen-Burgess problem is not an isolated issue. Any structure that admits
of non-trivial automorphisms will have places that share all their structural properties.
This is because automorphisms preserve structural relations, no matter how we define
them. If this is the case, and we think that Leibniz’s principle of the identity of
indiscernibles holds and that identity is not a primitive structural relation, then Shapiro
will be forced to conclude that there is only one imaginary root, and only one point
on the Euclidean plane. This would be absurd and would violate Shapiro’s faithfulness
constraint.
Shapiro’s solution to this criticism involves two parts. First, one must both deny
that the principle of the identity of indiscernibles holds for abstract objects, and allow
identity and non-identity to count as structural relations. The principle of the identity
of indiscernibles (normally attributed to Leibniz) is the principle that if two objects
share all of the same properties (i.e. they are indiscernible), then they are identical.
1

I will use the term “structural relationship” throughout, but not settle on a definition here. My
criticisms of Räz hold independently of what counts as a structural relationship, especially since he
takes the Burgess (1999) and Keränen (2001) issue to be solved (p. 118).
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As it is questionable whether it even holds for all physical objects (e.g. photons, see
Saunders (2003)), this is less controversial than it might at first appear.
Secondly, one needs to put in place a mechanism for talking about these indiscernible
objects. Mathematicians do it, and so in order to abide by the faithfulness constraint,
our philosophy of mathematics must be capable of explaining how they successfully
discuss these objects. In other words, we need a mechanism to distinguish, semantically,
the metaphysically indistinguishable objects. Shapiro (2008) uses parameters to explain
this phenomenon. In essence, when we are speaking of indiscernible objects, it suffices
to introduce a parameter into the discourse which “picks out” one of the indiscernible
objects, and opt to use the parameter. Since all the objects in question have the same
properties, it only matters that we are speaking of one of them, not which one of them.
This move is clearly appealing to the rule for existential elimination in first order
logic. As long as the parameter has not already been used, when we have ∃xF (x), we
say “let b be any one of them”, i.e. suppose that F (b) and suppose nothing else about
b; then . . . . Similarly the ante rem structuralist can say
in this structure [the complex numbers], there is at least one square root of
−1 : ∃x(x2 = −1). So they let i be one such square root, and go on from
there. (Shapiro, 2008, p 300)
According to Shapiro, this explains how mathematicians are able to talk about indiscernible objects.
Consider a second example: trying to make Meno’s solution to doubling the square
fit the ARS framework.2 The proof usually proceeds by “abstractly” drawing a line
between diagonally opposite corners of any square which we wish to double, and constructing a square with the new line as an edge. It is simple and straightforward.
2

Thanks to Chris Pincock for suggesting this example.
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However, it is potentially hazardous for the ante rem structuralist. It seems that the
only structural relations of the square are represented by the edges. Since each corner
has the same number of edges attached to it, and each corner has exactly one other
corner it is not directly attached to, each corner of the given square is metaphysically
indistinguishable from any other. How does the structuralist even pick a corner to
begin with? First, she must add identity and non-identity to the list of structural relations of the given square. Then, she can state that there are four corners by stating
∃x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 (CornerOfSquare(x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 ) ∧ x1 6= x2 ∧ ... ∧ x3 6= x4 ). Next, she can
use the parametrization technique to “pick out” one of these four corners. She says
“let A be such an xi ”. With this in hand, she can say “let C be such an xi such that
C 6= A and there is no direct edge from A to C”. With A and C in hand, she can
proceed with Meno’s construction, since these are opposite corners. Moreover, it does
not matter which corners the parameters “A” and “C” pick out, just that they are
diagonal opposites, since this is all that is required for the proof. Thus, the ante rem
structuralist can proceed with the proof.
By adding identity and non-identity as structural relations, and removing the law
of the identity of indiscernibles, the original problem of Burgess (1999) and Keränen
(2001) involving metaphysically indistinguishable objects is not a problem for ARS at
all, and moreover Shapiro has provided a solution to the potential problem of semantically indistinguishable objects as well, by using parameters as tools to talk about
indistinguishable objects.3
3

A second solution, from Kouri (2010), has similar results, but uses different tools. Rather than
introducing parameters, we might also make use of a choice function. It is possible that mathematicians
are implicitly using a choice function in their reasoning when they refer to indiscernible objects. In
effect, this solution just makes explicit the feeling of “picking one arbitrarily” that Shapiro seeks to
capture with parameters. This second solution likely comes to the same thing as Shapiro’s.
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2

Räz’s Claims

Räz claims to have a new, similar, problem for ARS. In our terms, his is a problem of
semantic indistinguishability. This arises, he holds, because of a tension between the
faithfulness constraint and what he calls the no-naming constraint:
Certain mathematical structures with symmetries have the property that we
cannot name or refer to the objects, or places, in these structures because
they are too homogeneous. (Räz, 2015, p 118, Räz’s emphasis)
Räz is correct in claiming that this constraint applies to ARS, as long as we assume
that genuine names uniquely pick out objects. Shapiro agrees that he is subject to such
a constraint (though he would not see it as “constraining”):
There simply is no naming any point in Euclidean space, nor any place in a
finite cardinal structure and in some graphs, no matter how much we idealize
on our abilities to pick things out. The objects are too homogeneous for
there to be a mechanism, even in principle, for singling out one such place,
as required for reference, as that relation is usually understood. (cited by
Räz, p 118, but from Shapiro (2008, p 291))
So, then, how does the tension between the no-naming constraint and the faithfulness constraint arise? Räz’s example of this can be found on pages 119-124. I will
consider a simpler adaptation here. We will consider maps on a group of four objects which swap two objects and leave the other two fixed. These maps are examples
of permutations. The cycle type of such a map is {12 , 21 , 30 , 40 }, because there are
two cycles of length 1 (leaving two elements unchanged) and one cycle of length 2
(swapping two elements). There are no cycles of length 3 or 4. It is easy enough to
count how many cycles of a given cycle type there are. In this instance, we can sim6

ply list them by which two elements they swap. Suppose our group of four objects
consisting of objects named a, b, c, d. Then the six cycles would be “a-swapped-withb”, “a-swapped-with-c”, “a-swapped-with-d”, “b-swapped-with-c”, “b-swapped-with-d”
and “c-swapped-with-d”. There are six in total.
Here is where Räz claims the problem arises: mathematical practice allows us to
count how many permutations there are of each cycle type (as in the example above),
while ARS does not. ARS, he claims, cannot count the number of cycles of the type
{12 , 21 , 30 , 40 } since ARS cannot name the places in a structure with exactly four elements and no other relations. Consider for example the first two cycles “counted”
above: ‘a-swapped-with-b” and “a-swapped-with-c”. According to Räz, ARS has no
method of semantically distinguishing these two cycles. In fact, the ante rem structuralist cannot distinguish between any two of the six cycles above. Räz claims “all
that can possibly matter for the ante rem structuralist is that two (nonidentical) places
are swapped, while two further places, not identical to the former two, are left alone.
There is one such situation, not two, or six” (Räz, 2015, p 122). Thus, the tension
between faithfulness and no-naming arises: mathematical practice can count six such
cycles, ARS can only count one.
Räz claims that because mathematicians can count the number of permutations
“different permutations...that belong to the same cycle type are always distinguishable”
(Räz, 2015, p 122). This is what Räz calls the mathematicians’ “indirect answer” (p 122)
to whether or not the places in the cycle-type structure of size four can be named. He
claims that they can be named because they can be counted. For Räz, the fact that
“we can recover all the cycles belonging to a cycle type” amounts to distinguishing such
cycles. Thus, he claims, mathematicians can distinguish something which the ante rem
structuralist cannot.
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There is a problem here. Räz seems to insist that a mathematician’s ability to count
the number of permutations of a given cycle type implies that they are distinguishable.
This is not the case. It is known, for example, that there are exactly two roots of
−1, and that there are 2ℵ0 points on the Euclidean plane, even though these are not
distinguishable. The only thing counting allows us to do is to determine how many
of something there are, not distinguish them. So, just because a mathematician can
count the number of cycles of a given cycle type does not mean the mathematician
can distinguish them. Thus, the “indirect answer” that Räz points to on the part
of the mathematician is that the places can be counted; this indirect answer implies
nothing about whether the places can be distinguished. Moreover, if they cannot be
distinguished, then they cannot be named. The indirect answer to the question of
whether the different permutations of the same cycle type can be named that Räz
points to on behalf of the mathematician is that they can be counted, and nothing
more.
The claim Räz makes then must amount to the claim that, since ARS cannot name
the permutations of each cycle type in the cycle type structure, it cannot count the
permutations of any given cycle type. This means that the no-naming constraint forces
a proponent of ARS to give up the faithfulness constraint. Though mathematicians
can count places in this structure, ARS cannot account for this behaviour. According
to Räz, “there is no way for the ante rem structuralist to recover, or count, different
permutations [that instantiate each cycle type]” (Räz, 2015, p 122). If Räz is right,
then the ante rem structuralist must choose between the no-naming constraint and the
faithfulness constraint. Since no such choice is possible, contends Räz, ARS fails as a
viable philosophy of mathematics.
Unfortunately for Räz, this criticism will not hold water. I will show, in the next
section, that it is similar to the old Keränen-Burgess problem, and as such can be solved
8

by a version of the parametrization technique mentioned above. Lastly, I will suggest
that Räz’s proposed solution requires something like a parametrization technique as
well, and so is no better off than ARS.

3

Räz and Keränen & Burgess

Räz claims that the problem of structures being “too homogeneous” and hence subject
to the no-naming constraint is distinct from the problem suggested by Burgess (1999)
and expanded by Keränen (2001). He takes this to be the case since his criticism of
ARS does not rely on the use of the principle of identity of indiscernibles. It turns
out that Räz’s problem is similar enough to this old problem to be solved by the same
method. In effect, any structure admitting of non-trivial automorphisms will be “too
homogeneous” (in Räz’s words) or “non-rigid” (in Keränen’s words).
The difference, which must be what Räz is alluding to when he claims his problem
is new, is that Keränen suggests that this means that the ante rem structuralist must
identify the places, and Räz suggests that this means that the ante rem structuralist
cannot remain faithful to mathematical practice, because it cannot talk about the right
number of things. It is a difference, then, between metaphysical distinguishability and
semantic distinguishability. Though Räz is correct in stating that Keränen’s explanation of the problem uses the principle of identity of indiscernibles while his does not, it
does not mean the problems are totally distinct. In the next section, I will show that,
in fact, the parametrization solution to the original problem can be extended to solve
Räz’s problem.

9
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The old solution works

The first step to adopting any solution to an indistinguishability problem is to accept
that any map of a given cycle type will be metaphysically indiscernible from any other
map of that same cycle type. This is simply a fact. What Räz claims is that it is not
possible for an ante rem structuralist to count the number of permutations for any given
cycle type, and that since mathematicians can do this, it is a violation of faithfulness.
However, ARS can count the permutations by making use of parameters and second
order logic. Räz even says as much:
We could skolemize [sic] the axiom of the cardinal-four structure
∃x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 (x1 6= x2 ∧ ... ∧ x3 6= x4 ∧ ∀y(y = x1 ∨ y = x2 ∨ y = x3 ∨ y = x4 ))
by eliminating the outermost existential quantifiers by introducing new parameters a, b, c, d for each quantifier...Drawing on second-order logic, it is
even possible to deduce formally that there are exactly six different permutations [of the type {12 , 21 , 30 , 40 }] on the cardinal-four structure, i.e., on
the structure with exactly four objects. (Räz, 2015, p 123)
However, Räz claims that “using parameters does not solve the problem” (Räz,
2015, p 123). What he claims we need to be able to do is distinguish between the
six permutations we counted by the second order logic method. Räz holds that to
do this “we would need a one-one correspondence between parameters and places” (p
123), which is not possible, since this “ would essentially amount to naming the places
by using parameters” (p 124). This is partly right: we cannot require parameters
to uniquely pick the same object each time they are used, as this would violate the
no-naming constraint. What Räz claims here, though, is not quite right. We can,
for example, embed R2 into Euclidean space without thereby naming all of the points
in Euclidean space. Just because there is a one-to-one map does not mean that the
10

elements in the domain serve as names for those in the range. The claim, then, must
be that though parameters are acceptable for talking about places in structures, they
are not acceptable for talking about functions on those places. Importantly, Räz is
mistaken in one more respect: ARS can semantically distinguish, i.e. talk about, the six
permutations without having to assume there is only one of them. There are two ways
to do so: by using something like “parameters of parameters” or by using parameters
to build embeddings into larger structures.
The first method to do this is to treat the permutations (which are maps) as parameters of parameters. We can write a formula stating this which would also involve
existential quantification over the four places, as well as the six permutations. However, once we have this, we can use the parametrization technique twice, amounting to
something like two rounds of existential elimination. In the first instance, we settle on
parameters for places, and in the second for functions.
More specifically, this technique would proceed as follows.4 We start with something Räz admits the ante rem structuralist has access to: the one-step parametrization above, i.e. Räz’s a, b, c and d from page 123. Then, we use these parameters
in a second order existential formula. Let Φ(f, x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 ) abbreviate the following
4

Thanks to Neil Tennant for providing the details of this formalism.
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fourfold conjunction:
W

∀x((

x = xj ) ↔ ∃y y = f (x)) [dom(f ) = {x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 }]

1≤j≤4

∧ ∀z((

W

z = xj ) ↔ ∃x z = f (x)) [rng(f ) = {x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 }]

1≤j≤4

∧ ∀x∀x0 (f (x) = f (x0 ) → x = x0 )

[f is one-one]

∧ ∃x∃x0 (x 6= x0 ∧ f (x) = x0 ∧ f (x0 ) = x ∧ ∀z∀y((z 6= x ∧ z 6= x0 ∧ y = f (z)) → y = z))
[f swaps two distinct objects and is the identity function wherever else it is defined]
Now consider the claim
For any four distinct objects x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 , there exist exactly six distinct permutations f1 , f2 , f3 , f4 , f5 , f6 that swap exactly two of those objects, leaving
the other two undisturbed.
This is regimented as follows:

∀x1 ∀x2 ∀x3 ∀x4 (x1 6= x2 ∧ x1 6= x3 ∧ x1 6= x4 ∧ x2 6= x3 ∧ x2 6= x4 ∧ x3 6= x4 ) →


^

∃f1 ∃f2 ∃f3 ∃f4 ∃f5 ∃f6

¬∀x((

1≤i<j≤6

^

_

x = xk ) → fi (x) = fj (x))

1≤k≤4

Φ(fi , x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 )

1≤i≤6

^

∀g[Φ(g, x1 , x2 , x3 , x4 )
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_

→

∀x((

1≤i≤6

_

x = xk ) → fi (x) = g(x))]

1≤k≤4



We then parametrize, using a, b, c and d, as in the first level parametrization above to:

(a 6= b ∧ a 6= c ∧ a 6= d ∧ b 6= c ∧ b 6= d ∧ c 6= d) →


^

∃f1 ∃f2 ∃f3 ∃f4 ∃f5 ∃f6

¬∀x((

_

x = xk ) → fi (x) = fj (x))

1≤i<j≤6

xk =a,b,c,d

^

Φ(fi , a, b, c, d)

1≤i≤6

^
→

_

∀x((

1≤i≤6

∀g[Φ(g, a, b, c, d)

_

x = xk ) → fi (x) = g(x))]

xk =a,b,c,d



We can then use a second set of parameters, H, K, L, M, N, P , to get:

(a 6= b ∧ a 6= c ∧ a 6= d ∧ b 6= c ∧ b 6= d ∧ c 6= d) →
^

¬∀x((

H,K,L,M,N,P =fi 6=fj =H,K,L,M,N,P

_

x = xk ) → fi (x) = fj (x))

xk =a,b,c,d

^

Φ(fi , a, b, c, d)

fi =H,K,L,M,N,P

^
→

_
fi =H,K,L,M,N,P

∀g[Φ(g, a, b, c, d)

∀x((

_

xk =a,b,c,d
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x = xk ) → fi (x) = g(x))]

Now, since we know that the parameters a, b, c, and d represent distinct objects,
we can also deduce from this that the parameters H, K, L, M, N, P represent distinct
objects. I take it this is the type of procedure Räz is alluding to when he suggests “it
is even possible to deduce formally that there are exactly six different permutations
on the cardinal-four structure.” This is what allows us to semantically distinguish the
functions; we can talk about exactly one of them – without assuming that there is only
one of them – by using a parameter to talk about the one. So the problem is solved,
and we can semantically distinguish the permutations in question. However, it might
be the case that Räz is objecting to precisely the move that we can have parameters of
parameters. If that is the case, then there is a second option.
The second option is to use parameters to talk about the four indistinguishable
places in a structure, and then embed that structure into a larger one to talk about the
permutations. Räz suggests something along these lines towards the end of the paper.
He states
We can think of finite cardinal structures in terms of cycle types, but also in
terms of conjugacy classes or partitions of natural numbers. One advantage
of these different representations is that we can use our knowledge of one of
the representations for all the others. (Räz, 2015, p 124)
However, what he seems to miss is that this strategy is open to the ante rem structuralist
as well as the mathematician. ARS has the capacity to embed simpler structures into
more robust structures and, in Räz’s words, use our knowledge of that structure for
all the others. Thus, even if it turns out that the ante rem structuralist cannot count
the number of permutations in any given cycle type, she is welcome to embed the cycle
type structure into a more robust one, say one where the places in the structure are
14

just the first four natural numbers, and use that to figure out that there are a certain
number of permutations of any given type. We see this happen often enough. For
example, one way to count the square roots of −1 is to embed the complex number
structure into the real plane, R2 . We know what is true of the simpler structure in the
more robust structure and the original language must have been true all along, and
so this embedding allows us to count the roots of −1 in the original complex number
structure. Since we have parametrized the original structure, we know that there are
distinct places in the original structure which correspond to the places in the larger
structure, and so we know there is something in the smaller structure corresponding to
what we have counted in the larger structure.
Räz claimed that ARS violated faithfulness because mathematicians could count
the number of permutations of any given cycle type. Here, though, we see that the ante
rem structuralist can count the number of permutations of a given cycle type. ARS
has the tools required to do exactly what Räz suggests they cannot. It can give the
same indirect answer that mathematicians are in a position to give as to whether the
permutations of a given cycle type are distinguishable: they can be counted. I have
provided two techniques which show how this is possible.

5

Räz’s In Re Solution

Räz proposes an alternative solution to the conflict he claims is problematic for ARS.
He suggests that the solution is to treat mathematical objects as in re. In this section,
I will discuss his solution, and show that Räz fares no better addressing this nearby
problem than an ante rem structuralist.
Considering a mathematical object as in re is opposed to considering it as ante
rem. For Räz, to treat a mathematical object as in re is to treat it as its instantiation,
15

rather than to treat it as something prior to any instantiation (which is how an ante rem
system treats mathematical objects). Ultimately he thinks that the solution to conflict
between faithfulness and no-naming is to develop a system that treats mathematical
objects in two ways: as in re and as ante rem. This means mathematical objects can
be treated both as prior to their instantiations, and as the instantiations themselves.
Shapiro’s ante rem system, on the other hand, treats mathematical objects as being
strictly prior to their instantiations (claims Räz).5
Räz says a number of things about what it means to treat mathematical objects as
in re. However, he seems to vacillate between treating these instantiations as merely
parameterizations of ante rem structures, or as properly named objects with more
properties than their ante rem counterparts. On page 124, he gives as an example
of instantiating an abstract structure “let π be a permutation of type x...”. This is
very similar to Shapiro’s use of parameters to make sense of mathematicians’ apparent
reference to indiscernible objects. The first step in such an analysis is to say something
like “let i be one such square root...”. If all Räz means by in re is that we can use
parameters as Shapiro describes, then there is no difference between Räz’s position
and ARS. Thus, the first option is no different from Shapiro’s ARS-plus-parameters
position as its stands, so we will assume that he means the second: that instantiations
of structures are properly named instances of them. On Räz’s in re system, then,
mathematical objects are just the places in instantiations of structures. Considering
the mathematical objects in re, Räz claims, we can count the permutations in the
5

There is a significant problem in Räz’s reading of Shapiro’s position here. Räz seems to think that
ARS cannot also view structures as instantiated. However, this is not the case. Though mathematical
objects are strictly speaking prior to their instantiations, there is nothing that prevents the ante
rem structuralist from adopting the places-as-offices perspective (rather than places-as-objects) from
Shapiro (1997). Under this perspective, we consider the places in structures as occupied by objects,
rather than as the objects themselves. This would allow an ante rem structuralist to consider a
structure as an in re object. Räz seems to ignore this possibility. I will not address this discrepancy
further here, for even ignoring this issue, Räz’s position fails to avoid the problem he presents.
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cycle-type structure by counting the permutations in an instantiation of the cycle-type
structure where the places are named.
How, then, does Räz propose to solve the counting problem? Well, if we take any
instantiation of the cycle-type structure mentioned above, we will be able to count
the number of permutations of any particular type. The names of the places in the
instantiation (Räz uses the instantiation where the places are named 1, 2, 3 and 4) are
non-structural properties. However, using these non-structural properties we can count
the permutations of any given type. This counting is very simple, as once the places
are named we can easily distinguish previously indiscernible objects. For example, the
permutation that “swaps” 1 and 2, but sends 3 and 4 to themselves is easily distinguished from the permutation that “swaps” 3 and 4, but sends 1 and 2 to themselves.
Thus, we have at least two permutations of the cycle type {12 , 21 , 30 , 40 }, and we can
easily count all six in this way.
Here is the problem: what we count is the number of permutations of an instantiation, not of the original structure. In order to count the number of permutations of a
structure via its instances, we would have to know which named place in the instantiation corresponded to which place in the original structure. This violates the no-naming
constraint. ARS addresses this issue via parameterizations, so there is no difficulty for
Shapiro. However, this violation means that the problem is still there for the in re approach unless we have parameters to begin with. We have not counted the places in the
original structure, but merely an instantiation of it. This leaves the problem unsolved.
This also leaves Räz without one potential advantage over ARS. We might have
thought that it was the use of parameters which was problematic, and not just parameters representing objects other than places in structures. However, Räz’s solution
fares no better here. He will need to make use of something similar to maintain a
correspondence between structures and their instantiations.
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Conclusion

Räz claims he has presented a new problem for ARS. I have shown that it is not an
entirely new problem, but rather is very similar to the problem presented by Burgess
(1999) and Keränen (2001). As such, the solution to this problem from Shapiro (2008)
works here, as well as a new solution via structural embeddings. Finally, I suggested
that Räz’s proposed solution, even if it was needed, is no solution at all, and would
require parameters all the same.6
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